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A number of explanations of the recent behav-
ior of the wage rate point to macroeconomic
changes as the cause. Some of the most com-
monly heard have to do with the effects of in-
creased foreign competition faced by the U.S.
One version of this argument involves the be-
havior of the dollar. It states that the relatively
high dollar in the early 1980s led to increased
competition from abroad and forced the indus-
trial sector in the u.s. to contract, eliminating a
large number of high-paying manufacturing jobs.
As a consequence, the aggregate wage rate de-
clined. If this is the case, the problem should be
on the verge of disappearing, since the dollar's
decline in the second half ofthe 1980s should
have led to a rebound in the wage rate. However,
Chart 1 indicates that the wage rate of production
and nonsupervisory workers has continued to fall,
while the aggregate wage rate has shown little
change over the last few years.




evidence of a subsequent decline. At the same
time, the consumption wage of all workers grew
noticeably faster during the 1960s and early
1970s than during the late 1970s and the 1980s.
Below we discuss some of the factors that have
influenced the behavior of the aggregate wage
rate over the 1980s, as well as some factors that
have led to changes in the structure of wages.
In the last presidential election we heard the slo-
gan, "Good jobs at good wages!' And a recent
issue of Businessweek asked whether the under-
30 generation will If••• be the first Americans
to be less prosperous than their parents." These
statements reflect widespread concern that real
wages dropped during the 1980s. In an attempt
to understand this concern, this Letter first looks
at how the real wage has behaved over the last
decade or so, and then discusses what we learn
from some recent research on the behavior of
wages in the 1980s.
What do the data show?
One way to think about real wages is as a meas-
ure of purchasing povver-the amount of goods
and services a worker can consume for each
hour of work. (For this reason I will refer to it as
the consumption wage below.) To obtain this
measure of the real wage, we deflate the hourly
nominal wage by the implicit price deflator for
consumption.
Chart 1 plots the purchasing power of one hour of
labor from 1964Q1 (the first date for which these
wage data are available) to 1991Q1 for two groups
of workers. The consumption wage of production
and nonsupervisory workers shows a sustained
rise through the late 1960s and the early 1970s.
Two sharp recessions followed, and while the real
wage for this group rose after the first recession,
it has shown no tendency to rise after the second
one. Instead, a period of relatively flat real wages
in the first half of the 1980s has been followed by
sharp drops over the last five years. It is this latest
decline that appears to have spurred the debate
about the falling real wage.
The second line in the chart shows the consump-
tion wage of all workers in the nonfarm private
sector. This series is obtained by deflating the to-
tal compensation per hour of all workers in the
nonfarm private sector by the implicit price de-
flator for consumption. The contrast between real
wages for production and nonsupervisory work-
ers and for aii workers is immediate: There is no
peak in the consumption wage of all private sec-
tor workers during the 1970s, nor is there anyFRBSF
This behavior suggests that the effects of in-
creased foreign competition will not go away
with a lower dollar. One way that increased for-
eign competition may have had a long-lasting
effect on the domestic vvage iate is by weakening
labor unions. The automobile industry is a good
example: It has had a tradition of strong unions
and also has been hit hard by foreign competi-
tion. To the extent that wages in the unionized
sector are higher than in the nonunionized sector,
weaker unions should imply lower wages overall.
Of course, increased foreign competition is not
the only factor that has weakened unions in re-
cent years. Economists have pointed out that
unions have lost strength because of domestic
developments, such as the deregulation of the
transportation and communication industries, as
well as worsening worker attitudes toward unions.
Rapid growth in nonunion employment over the
1980s has meantthat unions now represent a
much smaller proportion of the labor force.
A relatively high unemployment rate is often
mentioned as another factor that may have ex-
erted downward pressure on the wage rate in the
1980s. However, it is worth noting that the unem-
ployment rate averaged 8.3 percent over 1980-84
but only 6.3 percent over 1985-89. While a high
unemployment rate may have restrained wage
increases during the early 1980s, this argument is
much harder to see in the late 1980s. In fact, as a
look at Chart 1 indicates, the fall in the consump-
tion wage of production and nonsupervisory
workers has been concentrated in the second
half of the 1980s, a period when the unemploy-
ment rate was relatively low and falling.
Finally, the slow growth of wages in the 1980s
may reflect a slowdown in productivity growth
that began in the 1970s. Economists do not com-
pletely understand what caused this slowdown,
or why the slowdown should have continued into
the 1980s. In any event, slow productivity growth
cannot explain why the consumption wage of pro-
duction and nonsupervisory workers has been faIl-
ing, because productivity has actually increased
(on average) over this period.
The role of education and skills
An important difference between the two wage
rates shown in the chart has to do with the kinds
of workers whose wages are included in each
category. In particular, workers with relatively
high levels of education and skills are more likely
to be included in the group of all workers and
not in the group of production and nonsupervi-
sory workers. This distinction matters because
the wage of workers with relatively low educa-
tion and skills has declined rather noticeably in
the 1980s.
Evidence on the behavior of relative wages is
available in a number of recent studies of the
wage structure. For instance, Katz and Revenga
(1989) note that education wage differentials have
widened dramatically in the 1980s, especially for
those justenteringthe laborforce. Similarly, Bound
and Johnson (1989) use statistical analysis to show
that the rate of return to education increased by
almost 50 percent from 1979 to 1987. They also
report that the wages of experienced workers
increased relative to those of inexperienced
workers, while the wages of female workers
rnoved closer to those of male workers.
What accounts for the inCieased returns to edu-
cation and experience, and the shrinking gender
gap? The answer,to some people's surprise, is not
demographic change. That answer would make
sense if the supply of highly educated workers,
experienced workers, and female workers had
declined. But, as Bound and Johnson point out,
the labor force got more educated, older, and
therefore more experienced, and more female.
Thus, demographic change is unlikely to be an
important factor in explaining these changes.
A more likely answer is that product demand has
shifted over this period. One reason for such a
shift is the increase in the openness ofthe u.s. eco-
nomy: the demand for some U.S.-manufactured
goods has fallen because more acceptable sub-
stitutes are now being imported,whilethe demand
for others has risen because they are now being
exported. Since the average foreign worker is less
skilled than the average u.s. worker, a more open
economy (and the higher trade deficits run by the
U.S.) implies that the unskilled domestic worker
will face more competition as a consequence. In
other words, increased international trade will
affect the unskilled worker more than the skilled
worker. In addition, as Katz and Revenga point
out, product demand seems to have shifted from
manufacturing industries, which tend to employ
men with relatively less education, to services,
which employ high school and college educated
women and college educated men.Researchers also have stressed the role played
by technical change, pointing out that technical
developments over this period are likely to have
raised the returns to highly skilled labor. The rapid
proliferation of computers is an obvious example
of such a change. As a consequence, employers
will be willing to bid more for workers with the
relevant skills. Such a development would also
explain why the returns to education went up
during the 1980s, since higher returns are con-
sistent with higher demand.
Another factor exerting downward pressure on
the wages of men with relatively less education
is the weakening of unions, since unions are
more likely to be found in industries that tend
to employ such workers.
Thus, factors such as shifting product demand,
technological change, and weaker unions all
seem to have played some role in the observed
decline in the real wage of relatively less skilled
workers. At this point in time it seems difficult to
identify which single factor has been the most
important.
Conclusions
What, then, should one make of the widespread
concern about the falling real wage? Our discus-
sion suggests that such concern reflects what
is happening to one particular segment ofthe
workforce. Available data show that the wages of
workers with relatively less education are down;
in addition, the decline seems to be concen-
trated in industries that were more unionized,
that employed relatively more men, and that have
been hit harder by foreign competition. While
these individuals have suffered as a result, look-
ing at their wage alone will lead to a biased view
of how the economy-wide wage rate has been
behaving. The data reveal that relatively high-
skilled workers have continued to do well, and
the returns to college education have gone up
sharply. Thus, the effect on relative wages appears
to have been more pronounced than the effect on
the aggregate, economy-wide wage rate.
At the same time, it is obvious that wage growth
over the 1980s was nowhere like wage growth
during the 1960s. indeed, the consumption wage
for all private sector workers seems to have shown
iittle net change over the last five years (although
it is likely that there will be some bounce-back
after the current recession). Factors such as in-
creased foreign competition probably have played
some role in this change in behavior. There has
also been a widely remarked upon slowdown
in labor productivity during the mid-1970s, the
causes of which are imperfectly understood, at
best. The bottom line is that while the aggregate
consumption wage rate did not fall dramatically
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